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We contribute to the literature by implementing nonlinear error correction mechanisms 
when estimating the exchange-respective contribution to price discovery (information share) 
of cross-listings and their original listings.1 The existing methods assume linear convergence 
of price deviations to parity whereas we hinge our premise on the reality that when premiums 
or discounts on cross-listings are profitably arbitrageable, they disappear faster than 
otherwise and that convergences may be gradual and nonlinear.  
Price discovery is the process by which information is priced in the market. When a 
security is traded in multiple markets, determining where and how price discovery occurs is 
important. Harris et al. (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) examine the information share of the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for fragmented (multi-market traded) stocks on the 
NYSE and other U.S. exchanges, and confirm the NYSE’s leadership role. As for 
international cross-listing, Bacidore and Sofianos (2002) and Solnik et al. (1996) suggest that 
most price discovery occurs in the home market where considerable information originates. 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) report that U.S. host exchanges, to a lesser extent than the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX), determine the prices of Canadian cross-listings.  
In the literature, there are two broad approaches to estimating the contribution of each 
market to the price discovery of fragmented listings. Hasbrouck’s (1995) innovation variance 
approach extracts information shares by employing variance decomposition based on the 
vector moving average representation of an error correction model (ECM). Harris et al.’s 
(1995, 2002) common factor approach employs permanent-transitory decomposition of a 
cointegrated system to estimate the information share of each market. As Eun and Sabherwal 
(2003) show, Hasbrouck’s (1995) approach involves the Cholesky factorization of the 
                                                 
1  We illustrate our methods using cross-listings. However, these methods can be applied to other 
informationally linked markets, such as commodity futures, foreign exchanges, bonds etc. See Liu and An 




covariance matrix of innovations to prices on various exchanges, yielding multiple 
information shares. This may cause confounding effects on the identification of the venue of 
price discovery. Hasbrouck’s (2002) modification can be numerically onerous on 
implementation. 2  We expand Harris et al.’s (1995, 2002) platform and complement 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) idea. 
Harris et al. (1995) associate error correction dynamics with the price discovery of 
cross-listed pairs which are cointegrated3 by the law of one price. The cointegrating vectors 
of the vector ECM (VECM) represent the long-run equilibrium (near-parity condition), while 
the error correction terms characterize the convergence mechanism. Through representation, 
the relative extent of the contribution made by each market to the price discovery of 
fragmented stocks, using the estimates of adjustment coefficients, is assessed. Harris et al. 
(2002) buttress the method earlier formulated in Harris et al. (1995) by incorporating a 
microstructure model in which the price is assumed to be the sum of an efficient (permanent) 
price component and an error (transitory) term.4 
However, an implicit assumption made in Harris et al. (1995, 2002) is that adjustment 
to parity, the long-run equilibrium, is continuous and linear. Various economic circumstances 
challenge such restrictions, particularly where transaction costs and policy intervention are 
present. According to the empirical findings of Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), impediments to 
arbitrage gravity are both explicit and implicit. The former observable sources of market 
                                                 
2 See De Jong (2002), Harris et al. (2002), and Hasbrouck (2002) for further discussion. 
3 A group of multiple random-walk processes is cointegrated if, by definition, there exists a stationary linear 
combination of the processes. A time series is (weakly) stationary if the probability laws (of up to the second 
moments) are time-invariant. 
4 In Harris et al. (2002), the efficient price component is unobservable and reflects the underlying fundamentals. 
Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) permanent-transitory decomposition posits the permanent price as a linear 
combination of the observable prices where the normalized weights are market-respective information shares. 
The higher the normalized weight of an exchange, the bigger its influence on setting the permanent price. 
Normalized weights are orthogonal to the adjustment coefficient vector, which can be conveniently obtained 




frictions are taxes,5 transactions costs, holding costs, and short-sale restrictions. Transaction 
costs of an arbitrage on a diverged cross-listed pair are commissions to home and host 
exchanges, bid-ask spreads on the cross-listed pair and the foreign exchange rate, and price 
impacts on both cross-border listings. While their arbitrage portfolios are active, arbitrageurs 
incur holding costs which include lending fees (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), the unrealized 
interest on short-sales proceeds, the opportunity cost of capital, and firm-level risks (Pontiff, 
2006). Although it does not persistently apply to the Canadian cross-listings on U.S. 
exchanges, temporary and regulatory bans of short sales on the home exchanges of specific 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) render arbitrageurs’ transactions more costly thereby 
increasing their required returns (Bris et al., 2007).  
The hidden hurdles to swift parity-convergences of cross-listed pairs may stem from 
cross-border differential adverse selection risks (Chen and Choi, 2012) and agency walls 
between the entrusted arbitrageurs and their investor clients (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Chen and Choi (2012) find that the original Canadian listings on the TSX suffer more from 
asymmetric information than their cross-listings on the NYSE. As a result, an average 
Canadian cross-listed pair exhibits an adverse selection discount on the TSX and a relative 
premium 6  on the NYSE by 30.6 basis points, based on the ten-minute frequency 
US$-denominated prices of 56 cross-listed pairs through the sample period of 1998–2000. An 
unimformed arbitraguer will be forced to close her portfolio early at a substantial deviation in 
the pair upon sensing “flow toxicity.” Also, an outsourced portfolio manager have less 
incentive to act less aggressively when investors solely evaluate him by his returns in a 
                                                 
5 Although it does not apply to our sample period from 1998 to 2000, exchanges have begun imposing 
data-traffic taxes and charges to the institutional arbitrageurs for their data-heavy, high frequency trades. 
6 We define the “relative premium” as the percentage premium of a cross-listed stock traded on a foreign 
exchange against the home market share, adjusted by the exchange rate. The term “cross-listing premium” 
defined by Doidge et al. (2004) is the excess value of foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. relative to those not 




“separation of brains and capital” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Given these intricacies of the trading environment with various transaction costs and 
obstacles, nonlinear parity-convergences of cross-listed pairs capture the market to a higher 
proximity. The rationale of nonlinear modeling is straightforward. A relatively small 
deviation of the price of a cross-listing from its parity-implied price is unarbitrageable if the 
dollar spread is insufficient to cover fees, commissions, liquidity shortfalls, and other related 
costs. In this case, the dollar premium or discount behaves like a near-unit root process and 
will not converge to parity. Arbitrage forces will activate as the spread widens beyond the 
threshold, determined by transaction costs and associated risk premiums of arbitrage. There 
may be another case that there is more than a single break-even price spread in a cross-listed 
pair: The transition from a profitable status to an unarbitrageable one can be “smooth” due to 
multiple and overlapping regime-switching effects.   
To date, we find a dearth of articles with nonlinear frameworks in the literature. Among 
those found, Rabinovitch et al. (2003) use a nonlinear threshold model to estimate the 
adjustment dynamics of the return deviations for 20 Chilean and Argentine cross-listings. 
Koumkwa and Susmel (2005) suggest two nonlinear adjustment models: The exponential 
smooth transition autoregressive (ESTAR) and the logarithmic smooth transition 
autoregressive (LSTAR) to delineate the relative premiums of Mexican ADRs. Chung et al. 
(2005) study the dynamic relationship between the prices of three Taiwanese ADRs and their 
underlying stocks using a threshold VECM. 7  For nonparametric estimation of the 
convergence speed parameter of Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) to capture time-varying nature, 
Chen et al. (2008) sampled the cross-listed pairs of Asia-Pacific firms and find that market 
integration is positively associated with parity-convergence speed. These articles are devoted 
to the asset pricing aspect of cross-listings, whereas our novel approaches focus on the price 
                                                 
7 As a linear modeling precursor, see Kim et al. (2000) for vector autoregressive (VAR) and seemingly 




discovery of multi-market listings using nonlinear frameworks. 
We extend Harris et al.’s (1995, 2002) ECM to estimate the exchange-respective 
information shares of Canadian cross-listed pairs traded on the NYSE and the TSX8 by first 
considering threshold cointegration according to Balke and Fomby (1997) and then 
generalizing it to a smooth transition version. Departing from linear modeling, our 
information share measures are derived from outer-regime adjustment coefficients based on a 
two-regime threshold ECM, and average coefficient estimates based on a smooth transition 
ECM. The former method is intuitively appealing whereas the latter amendment risks less 
model misspecification.  
Our alternative methods have many advantages. We theoretically depict and 
empirically analyze the discrete dynamics of both abrupt and smooth parity-convergences, 
which are frequently observed in the market due to risk factors such as information 
asymmetry and market friction. A large deviation from parity, far beyond the threshold 
(extreme regime), is a very profitable arbitrage opportunity and is more likely to reflect 
information shocks than a small deviation from parity, which may reflect noise trading.9 A 
gradual and nonlinear conversion to parity is better detected with our smooth transition ECM 
framework. Thus, our methods capture the relative contributions to price discovery to a 
                                                 
8 Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Chen and Choi (2012), we choose to study Canadian stocks listed in 
the U.S. for several reasons. First, Canadian equities are the largest group of stocks cross-listed in the U.S. from 
any single country. Second, many of these Canadian stocks trade actively on both the NYSE and the TSX which 
is essential for conducting intraday tests. Third, the trading hours of the TSX coincide with those of the NYSE 
(9:30AM— 4:00PM, EST). Finally, Canadian stocks trade in the U.S. as ordinary shares due to compatible 
accounting standards, whereas most other cross-listed shares are ADRs issued by U.S. custodian banks.  
9 A similar idea is illustrated by Gonzalo and Martinez (2006) in a model of the price discovery for stocks 
traded in a single market. In their model, only new information which implies a profit greater than the 
transaction cost, measured by bid-ask spread, is translated into the transaction price. In other words, the shocks 
that drive the efficient price component must be big shocks to the transaction price. The transactions of 
uninformed agents cannot generate big inefficient changes in transaction prices, because informed traders will 





higher degree compared with existing linear approaches in the literature which circumvent 
the time- and regime-contingent characteristics of information shocks. 
In addition, we identify and explicate the factors that affect estimated information 
shares and thresholds. Specifically, the empirical implications are as follows: First, the TSX 
and the NYSE appear to have integrated over time. Second, parity-convergence accelerates 
upon discounts on the cross-listings on the NYSE. Third, we find a larger feedback from the 
NYSE if the price gap exceeds the threshold (required arbitrage return). Fourth, informed 
traders tend to cluster on the NYSE upon discounts on the cross-listings. Fifth, information 
share and threshold are affected by the relative degree of private information, market friction 
and liquidity measures, firm-level characteristics, and aggregate risks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops econometric 
models implied from a price discovery model of cross-listings developed in Appendix A10: 
The existing standard ECM and our threshold and smooth transition ECMs. Section 3 
describes the data, defines the variables, and presents statistical test and estimation retsults. 
Panel regression analyses are discussed in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Error correction models 
The equilibrium model constructed in Appendix A captures the measures of 
market-wise contributions to price discovery which are related to the relative populations of 
respective market participants (Equations (A.50) and (A.51)). However, it poses an empirical 
challenge since the “headcounts” are usually unknown. Fortunately, we can estimate the 
adjustment coefficients  and  using the ECM (Equation (A.48)) which only requires 
information of market prices. Another hurdle is that the adjustment coefficients  and  
are time-varying. In order to estimate the model, additional restrictions are necessary to 
                                                 
10 We provide a price discovery model of cross-listings to illustrate the role of arbitrageurs in Appendix A. It is 




characterize the time paths of  and . In the following three subsections, by adopting 
different assumptions on arbitraguers, the equilibrium model presented in Appendix A 
generates three different version of ECMs: standard ECM, threshold ECM, and smooth 
transition ECM. These models provide various estimates of the adjustment coefficients and, 
thus, information shares. 
2.1. Standard error correction model 
We begin with a standard ECM, where the adjustment coeffcients,  and , are 
assumed to be constant in Equation (A.48). All arbitrageurs are homogeneous and the market 
is perfectly competitive, i.e., there are neither transaction costs nor other market frictions. 
Under these assumptions, we have  in Equations (A.46) and (A.47) for all  and 
for any arbitrageur 1,2,⋯ , , with 0. It follows that 
≡ ,  (1) 
≡ ,  (2) 
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.  (3) 
Define the dollar premium on the cross-listing ( ) on the NYSE against its original 
listing ( , US$-translated) on the TSX as 
≡ .   (4) 
A standard ECM for the bivariate cointegrated system of the cross-listed pair ,  
can be structured as  
Δ ∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ ,  (5) 




where  gives the remaining cross-listing dollar premium or cointegrating residual. 
 and  are the adjustment coefficients of the TSX and the NYSE, respectively: They 
describe the degree of adjustment to the deviation to restore the long-run equilibrium in each 
series. By the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987; Engle and Yoo, 
1987), if  and  are cointegrated, then at least one of  and  must be nonzero. In 
other words, either  or  or both, will adjust fractionally to restore parity in the long 
run. 
Harris et al. (1995, 2000) propose to use the ECM adjustment coefficients to estimate 
the relative extent of exchange-respective contributions to the price discovery (information 
share) of shares whose order purchases are fragmented across multiple markets. For a 
Canadian company originally listed on the TSX and cross-listed on the NYSE, the proportion 
of the adjustments that takes place on the TSX out of the total adjustments on both exchanges 
is the contribution share of the home exchange in setting the long-run equilibrium price 
resulting from synchronous cross-border stock trading. In the extreme case where there is no 
feedback from the NYSE, such that 0, then the NYSE makes no contribution to the 
price discovery of the cross-listed pair. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) further define the 
respective information shares of the TSX and the NYSE as  
IS ≡
| |
| | | |
	and	IS ≡ | |
| | | |
.   (7) 
Suppose  in the previous period ( 1), then to reduce the gap between 
the two prices either  increases or  decreases, or both. In this case one can conjecture 
that  is non-positive and  is non-negative. There are two other possibilities: (1)  
decreases but  decreases more; or (2)  increases but  increases less.11 As 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) determine that the latter two results are very unlikely, they are not 
                                                 
11 These odds may reflect an under-reaction to the information share of the market. When information 




considered in our study. A similar adjustment mechanism can be designed to show that  is 
non-positive and  is non-negative for the symmetric situation when .12 
Therefore, we define the exchange-respective information shares of the TSX and the NYSE 
as 
≡ 	and	 ≡ .   (8) 
2.2. Threshold error correction model 
In reality, the market is imperfect due to various sources of market friction such as 
transaction costs, direct and indirect trading barriers, etc. We let the threshold ( ) measure the 
sum of transaction costs and risk premiums required from arbitrageurs (required arbitrage 
return).13 Arbitrage opportunities exist when  
≡ 	or	 ,   (9) 
which becomes | | . We still assume all arbitragers are homogeneous, such that 
they share a common demand elasticity. Under these assumptions, for any arbitraguer  and 
for all  in Equations (A.46) and (A.47) we have 
                                                 
12 This discussion is based on perfect arbitrage conditions, i.e., there are neither transaction costs nor arbitrage 
trading risks. However, as this is not necessarily true in practice these restrictions are not imposed in the 
estimation. 
13 The threshold as an “effective” break-even price spread depends on explicit and implicit sources of market 
frictions. According to Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), the observable, explicit sources of market frictions are taxes, 
transactions costs, holding costs, and short-sale restrictions. Transaction costs of an arbitrage on a diverged 
cross-listed pair are commissions to home and host exchanges, bid-ask spreads on the cross-listed pair and the 
foreign exchange rate, and price impacts on both cross-border listings. Arbitrageurs incur holding costs while 
their arbitrage portfolios are active which include lending fees (Barberis and Thaler, 2003), the unrealized 
interest on short-sales proceeds, the opportunity cost of capital, and firm-level risks (Pontiff, 2006). Temporary 
and regulatory bans of short sales on the home exchanges of certain ADRs render arbitrageurs’ transactions 
more costly thereby increasing their required returns (Bris et al., 2007). The hidden hurdles to swift 
parity-convergences of cross-listed pairs may stem from cross-border differential adverse selection risks (Chen 







.   (10) 
Now, cointegration between  and  is dormant within a range of disequilibrium 
but the error correction dynamics become active once the cross-listing dollar premium 
sufficiently diverges from parity beyond the threshold. Balke and Fomby (1997) propose this 
regime-switching mechanism as threshold cointegration, and the implied error correction 
dynamics can be characterized by a threshold ECM, given by  
Δ
∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ , if	| |
∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ , if	| |
,  (11) 
Δ
∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ , if	| |
∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ , if	| |
.  (12) 
We allow the beta coefficients to change conditional on the regime since irrational 
traders in each market, such as trend or contrarian traders, may look at both prices across the 
markets. When the price spread is large in the outer regime (| | ), traders may switch 
to another trading habit such that the relationship between the current price change and past 
price changes is different. In the middle regime when | | , there are neither market 
forces nor arbitrageurs to sustain the cointegration of the pair of prices. Unless the pair shows 
a significant price gap exceeding the threshold minimum profit, the adjustment coefficients 
are zeroes ( 0) and, thus, neither price (  or ) appropriately reflects risk. 
We define the information share, or the relative measure of contribution to price discovery, 






.   (13) 
  
                                                 
14 Eun and Sabherwal (2003) estimate the adjustment coefficients in every period using a linear ECM following 




2.3. Smooth transition error correction model 
A common assumption for the standard and threshold ECMs is the homogeneity of 
arbitrageurs. We now relax this assumption to allow for heterogeneous arbitrageurs since 
they may require differing thresholds ( ’s) to establish their respective positions. For 
example, using a database of arbitrage transactions on the NYSE, Neal (1996) finds that 
larger mispricings are positively related to the frequency of arbitrage porfolio construction. 
Moreover, fees paid by institutional investors depend on the arrangement between the 
investors and their executing brokers. The opportunity costs faced by capital-constrained 
arbitrageurs can be another reason for different threshold values: Investors with stricter 
capital constraints will skip small mispricings to wait for larger ones. Lastly, all traders are 
not alike in terms of risk aversion and/or risk perception. Overall, a unique break-even point 
for all arbitraguers does not exist. Specifically, we assume in Equations (A.46) and (A.47) for 
all  and for any arbitrageur 1,2,⋯ , ,  
0																				if	| |
∙ 0										 . .
.   (14) 
The “aggregate” threshold is a smoothing function of price deviations such that  
∑ 	 	
| |
	| | ≡ ,  (15) 
where  is the cumulative density function of  across all . Further 
| |
| | | |
≡ ,  (16) 
| |
| | | |
≡ .  (17) 
By inserting  and  into Equation (A.45), we obtain a smooth transition ECM 
writen as: 
Δ | | ∑ 	 Δ ∑ 	 Δ ,  (18) 




The “average” information shares of respective markets can be defined as 
≡
| |
| | | |
,  (20) 
≡
| |
| | | |
,  (21) 
where 
∑ 	 ,   (22) 
∑ 	 .   (23) 
In order to see whether informed traders will choose the market with a relative discount, 
we define the “cross” information share of an exchange where a discount or premium on the 
cross-border trading venue. We have 
≡
| |
| | | |
,  (24) 
≡
| |
| | | |
,  (25) 
≡
| |
| | | |
,  (26) 
≡
| |
| | | |
.  (27) 
For a cross-listed pair,  and 	 are the information shares of the TSX and the 
NYSE, respectively, when the TSX-listing trades at a discount ( 0);  and 	 
when the cross-listing posts a discount ( 0).    
 
3. Data, variables, and preliminary results 
3.1. Data 
In Table 1, 56 TSX-NYSE pairs are identified through the sample period, January 1, 
1998 through December 31, 2000. The fact that nearly half of these firms belong to the basic 
materials, oil and gas industries speaks to the rich natural resource endowment in Canada. 




oil and gas (19.6%), 8 in industrials (14.3%), 8 in financials (14.3%), 4 in consumer services 
(7.1%), 3 in technology (5.4%), 3 in telecommunications (5.4%), 3 in consumer goods (5.4%), 
2 in healthcare (3.6%), and 1 in utilities (1.8%). On a daily basis, an average Canadian firm 
closed at US$24.13 on the NYSE and at CAD36.74 on the TSX with a higher return volatility 
on the home exchange (0.6% > 0.2%). The sample firms in this study were also analyzed by 
Chen and Choi (2012) who argue that, based on ten-minute frequency US$-translated prices, 
an average NYSE listing earns a relative premium of 30.6 basis points against its TSX 
counterpart due to a higher home-market adverse seletion risk. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
In order to estimate asymmetric information and other market friction measures, 
high-frequency data are required for both the shares co-listed on the TSX and the NYSE, and 
the U.S.-Canada exchange rate. Accordingly, the tick-by-tick trade and quote data for the 
TSX-listed Canadian stocks and the Trade-And-Quote (TAQ) data of their cross-listings on 
the NYSE through the period are used. The exchange rate intraday data was purchased from 
Olson & Associates. Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003) the mid-points of the U.S.-Canada 
exchange rate bid and ask quotes are updated every minute, and the bid and ask quotes of the 
TSX-listed Canadian stocks are matched with their concurrent minutes’ exchange rate quote 
mid-points. Both the TSX and the NYSE trade from 9:30AM to 4:00PM, EST, and the 
US$-denominated price deviations are calculated with simultaneously observed cross-border 
prices and minute-frequency exchange rates.15 As a result, on an average trading day, we 
                                                 
15 During the sample period, the time stamps of trades and quotes on the TSX and the NYSE are recorded per 
second. In order to calculate the cross-border price deviations, the trade prices of both listings on the TSX and 
the NYSE are merged in chronological order according to the time stamps. The trade prices of the TSX listings 
are translated to US$-denominated values using the minute-frequency exchange rate. Any missing trade prices 
are extrapolated using their respective last preceding trade prices. As a result, each price deviation is the NYSE 
trade price less the US$-translated TSX trade price in the simultaneous observation row, or the 




observe 39 data points for each pair. Our sample period covers 756 trading days, but not all 
stocks are in pairs throughout the sample period. We require that for each firm-year the prices 
be observed in the two markets for at least 6 consecutive months. Consequently, having 
dropped thinly traded stocks on both exchanges, our final sample includes 40 cross-listed 
pairs and 104 firm-years. 
3.2. Cointegration analysis 
We first examine whether the pairs of times series on the TSX and the NYSE price 
series are unit roots We use the augmented Dickey and Fuller’s (1981) (ADF) test, which 
considers the lagged value of the first differences of the time series. If the test statistic is too 
large, then we reject the null hypothesis of the pair being a unit root and conclude that the 
time series is stationary. Consequently, the null hypothesis was rejected for only 4 firm-year 
time series data, at a 5% significance level. Thus, we conclude that both price series in our 
sample are, overall, first-order integrated ( 1 ), or unit units. 
We subsequently examine, using Johansen’s (1991) test, cointegration between the two 
price series. The S&P TSX Composite and the S&P 500 indices (market indices of the TSX 
and the NYSE, respectively) are not included in the cointegrated system since Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003) find that the estimated coefficients of the two index series are statistically 
insignificant. Since we have two price series in each regression equation, there is at most one 
cointegrating vector. We estimate the cointegrating vector ( 1, ) for each cross-listed 
pair in each year. Our results show that most of the estimated cointegrating vectors are 
1, 1 , which are the expected values according to the law of one price. Table 2 reports the 
summary statistics of the normalized estimation of the cointegrating vector for  and . 
The t-statistics for the null hypothesis confirm that the cointegrating vector equals 1, 1 .  
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 




1, 1  which confirms that the Canadian cross-listed pairs tend to follow the law of one 
price and are, therefore, cointegrated. Given the estimated cointegrating vector 1, , the 
estimated cross-listing dollar premium is ≅ . We, then, test ’s for stationarity 
through the ADF test and find that only 3 out of 104 firm-years do not reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, we conclude that the TSX-NYSE cross-listed pairs are 
cointegrated. 
3.3. Nonlinearity tests 
The law of one price suggests that two market prices for the same stock should not drift 
far from each other. This relationship is confirmed by the cointegration analysis in Section 
3.2. However, linear adjustment dynamics are not necessarily prescribed by market efficiency 
assumptions. Given various market frictions, such as transactions costs and short-sale 
limitations, it is more likely that a nonlinear model, such as a threshold or smooth transition 
cointegration model, provides a better description of the convergence of two market prices. In 
this section, we conduct several nonlinearity tests to determine the relationship of short-run 
adjustment dynamics to long-run parity equilibrium. 
We estimate the symmetric bivariate threshold ECM model in Section 2.2 and apply the 
supremum-Lagrangian multiplier (supLM) test to check for nonlinearity. This test also has 
power to detect smooth transition error correction dynamics as shown in Hansen and Seo 
(2002). We use Akaike’s (1974) and Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian information criteria to 
choose the number of lags, and consistently choose a lag length of 1 ( 1). The 
cointegrating vector is given as 1, 1 , after performing cointegration tests. The model is 
estimated by the maximum likelihood method described in Appendix B. The estimation 
results are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 




statistics. The p-values are computed by the parametric bootstrap method suggested by 
Hansen and Seo (2002). We find that the mean and median of the supLM for the whole 
sample are 73.52 and 31.05, which exceeds the 95% critical values of 24.78 and 23.10. 
Therefore, on average, we can reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect. 
To further confirm the test results, we apply a combined p-value test on all firm-years. 
Let  be the asymptotic p-value of the supLM test for each individual stock-year , for 
1, 2, . . . , , where  is the total number of firm-years. We combine all p-values ( ’s) 
to construct the Z-test statistic proposed by Choi (2001), and have: 
≡
√
∑ 	 2ln 2 ,   (28) 
which is asymptotically standard normal under the null hypothesis of no threshold 
effect. In our untabulated case, the combined p-value test statistic  is 33.41, significantly 
rejecting the null hypothesis with a 5% critical value at 1.96. Overall, we conclude that 
nonlinearity exists in the course of parity convergence.16 
Of interest is whether the threshold effect takes place on the coefficients of error 
correction terms or on the short-term dynamics terms in the threshold ECM of Equations (11) 
and (12). We separately test the threshold effect on these coefficients. Panel B of Table 3 
reports the test results. The first two columns (WaldECM1) report the Wald statistics for testing 
the null hypothesis on the error correction terms: : . In other words, we test 
whether the adjustment coefficients associated with the prices of TSX-listings ( ’s) are 
different within and beyond the threshold. Likewise, the third and fourth columns (WaldECM2) 
test the same hypothesis for the NYSE-listings: : . The last four columns 
(WaldDC1 and WaldDC2) report the Wald statistics for the null hypotheses of no threshold 
                                                 
16 We also repeated the estimation and testing procedures when the cointegrating vector is estimated from the 





effect for the TSX and the NYSE, respectively: :	 , ; and 
:	 , .  Rejecting these null hypotheses means accepting the 
threshold effect occurs on the short-term dynamics terms in the threshold ECM of the TSX 
and the NYSE, respectively. The untabulated, Z-test statistics (Choi, 2001) of the null 
hypotheses of error correction coefficients are 16.80 and 19.68, respectively, while those of 
the short-term dynamics coefficients are 13.95 and 14.44, respectively. Thus, for both 
exchanges, we conclude that there exists nonlinearity in both the error correction and the 
short-term dynamics terms.  
3.4. Estimation 
3.4.1. Microstructure measures 
Unlike the NYSE, which is a specialist-based auction exchange, the TSX is an 
electronic exchange, which uses a central limit order book (CLOB) system, where orders are 
required to be posted in the book to be valid.17 By studying decrements in the inside depth on 
one side of the quote that correspond to uncommon trade sizes (such as a trade of 1,300 
shares), matching trades with prevailing quotes with a five-second lead (Lee and Ready, 1991) 
is reasonable. Given a mid-quote made five seconds earlier, a trade is considered 
buyer-initiated if it is higher, and seller-initiated if lower.18 We construct datasets to estimate 
the probability of informed trading (PIN) following Easley et al. (1996, 2002). The 
NYSE-resident specialists are central to the theory of the PIN (Easley et al., 2001; Duarte and 
Young, 2009). There are official market makers, known as registered traders, on the TSX 
whose function is akin to that of the NYSE specialists. Thus, a comparison of trade 
                                                 
17 We owe this comment to Daniel Weaver. See Eun and Sabherwal (2003) for a detailed institutional 
comparison between the TSX and the NYSE. 





informedness on the two exchanges by the PIN is deemed appropriate.19 
The PINs for TSX and NYSE-listed Canadian stocks are estimated following Easley et 
al. (1996, 1997a,b). Further, we adopt Easley et al.’s (2008) log-likelihood function 
specification for improved numerical stability in PIN estimation. The bid-ask spreads are 
adjusted by the mid-quotes and, thus, measure the relative discrepancy between bid and ask 
quotes free from the exchange rate. Following Eun and Sabherwal (2003), the mid-points of 
U.S.-Canada exchange rate bid and ask quotes are updated every minute. The bid and ask 
quotes of the NYSE-listed Canadian stocks are matched with their concurrent minutes’ 
exchange rate quote mid-points.  
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
Table 4 summarizes the exchange-wise estimates and cross-exchange difference tests 
(Wilcoxon, 1945) of the PIN, relative quoted spread, daily trading volume, and daily trading 
dollar volume of our sample cross-listed pairs. First, on average, the PIN on the TSX (0.242) 
exceeds that on the NYSE (0.214). Second, the relative quoted spread on the TSX (0.015) is 
narrower than that on the NYSE (0.022). Third, for a Canadian cross-listed pair, on average, 
it appears that the intensity of informed trades tends to be heavier (a higher PIN) with a lower 
spread (competitive market making) on the TSX.20 The TSX dominates the NYSE in trading 
volume in terms of both quantity and value. The statistical significances of comparisons are 
well explained by near-zero p-values for all difference tests.21  
                                                 
19 We owe this comment to Lawrence Kryzanowski. See Fuller et al. (2008) for difficulties in estimating the 
PIN for Nasdaq trades. 
20 In the cross-section, the PIN is positively correlated with bid-ask spread according to Easley et al. (2002). 
However, the negative relationship between the two estimates shown in Table 4 is due to averaging and 
aggregation.  
21 Based on, unreported, ten-minute frequency relative premiums of the cross-listed pairs traded throughout the 
sample period, the arithmetic mean, the median, and the standard deviation are 0.00306, 0.00004, and 0.03031, 
respectively. The average relative premium of 30.6 basis points with a 3.03% volatility is a statistically 




3.4.2. Estimation of the threshold and convergence speed parameter 
In our threshold ECM, the threshold ( ), on average, measures the sum of transaction 
costs and risk premiums of a cross-border arbitrage. The first column (Threshold) in Panel A 
of Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the estimated thresholds, which range from 0.01 
to 0.81, with a mean of 0.193: On average, when the cross-listing dollar premium/discount 
records more than ±19.3 cents, respectively, arbitrageurs begin to take positions on both sides 
and drive the deviation back into the “no-arbitrage” band. The percentage of data points 
falling into the outer regime ranges from 10.24% to 88.69%, with a mean of 17.0% (second 
column in Panel A of Table 3). 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
According to our smooth transition ECM, the convergence speed parameter ( ), on 
average, measures the reciprocal speed of converenge to parity of a cross-listed pair (Section 
2.3).22 The first column (Delta) in Panel A of Table 5 reports the summary statistics of the 
estimates of convergence speed parameters with a mean of 0.669 and a median of 0.654. To 
see how the convergence speed is affected by the price deviation, the second and third 
columns report the results for  when there is a premium (DeltaPrem) or discount (DeltaDisc) 
on the NYSE-listing. Panel B reports the trends of  and shows downward trends in both the 
mean and the median of , which suggest that the NYSE and the TSX have integrated over 
time. In Panel C we apply the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the null hypothesis in Panel C: 
: Delta Delta . The p-value is smaller than 0.01, thus, we can reject the null 
hypothesis: The convergence between the two market prices accelerates when there is a 
relative discount on the NYSE.23 A possible explanation is that arbitrageurs like to establish 
short positions on the TSX since stocks are likely to be more liquid in the home market 
                                                 
22 The smooth-transition model is estimated nonparametrically without any assumption on the functional form. 





[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
As an illustrative case, we take Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc. (TSX ticker: A; NYSE ticker: 
ABY) as an example and report its estimation results, with the linear and threshold ECMs for 
the sample years of 1998, 1999, and 2000, in Panels A and B of Table 6, respectively. In 
Panel B, the linearity hypothesis of the ECM is tested using the supremum-Wald statistic 
suggested by Hansen (1996). According to Andrews (1991) and Hansen (1996), this test has 
the power to reject the null hypothesis for both threshold and smooth nonlinear effects.25 The 
cross-listed pairs of Abiti-Consolidated, Inc. do not converge linearly as the supremum-Wald 
statistics exceed their respective 95 percent critical values in 1998 and 1999. The rejection of 
the nonlinearity hypothesis in 2000 is shown in Figure 1 which plots the adjustment 
coefficient functions of the smooth transition ECM for A and ABY prices in the respective 
sample years of 1998, 1999, and 2000. Of these, the adjustment coefficient curve of the 
cross-listing on the NYSE in 2000 is nearly linear with a downward slope while the other 
graphs show nonlinear patterns. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
3.4.3. Estimation of the information share 
Given a cross-listed pair, the information share of an exchange measures its 
contribution to price discovery. We estimate information shares using the three ECMs 
described in Section 2. The first column in Panel A of Table 7 reports the estimated 
information share of the NYSE from the standard, linear ECM. With a shorter sample period 
(February-July, 1998) Eun and Sabherwal’s (2003) information share estimates of the NYSE 
                                                 
24 We cautiously view this interpretation as valid since the proportion of discounted cross-listings ( ) is 
50.6% using observations at 10-minute intervals throughout the sample period. 
25 Since the threshold ECM is discrete and the smooth transition ECM is continuous, these ECMs are not nested. 




range from 0.2% to 98.2%, with a mean of 38.1% in the cross-section of sample firms. They 
conclude that price discovery for most cross-listed pairs occurs in the TSX, but that there is 
significant feedback from the NYSE. Our results, based on a longer sample period, are 
consistent: The estimated linear information shares (IS) of the NYSE range from 3% to 
94.5%, with a mean of 42.99%. There is no discernible trend over the sample period as the 
yearly average estimates of the linear information share of the NYSE in 1998, 1999, and 
2000 are 39.3%, 48.4%, and 41%, respectively (first column in Panel B of Table 7). 
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
However, the linear ECM ignores nonlinearity in the course of parity-convergence, as 
shown in Section 3.3, and this suggests that the estimates from the linear ECM may be biased. 
Accordingly, we estimate the information shares via both the threshold and the smooth 
transition ECMs. 
The second and third columns in Panel A of Table 7 report the results for the bivariate 
threshold ECM presented in Section 2.2. The information share estimates of the NYSE in the 
inner regime (ISIn) range from 1.7% to 91%, with an average of 36.2%, while in the outer 
regime (ISOut) they range from 2% to 98%, with an average of 43.5%.
26 Thus the NYSE 
makes a larger contribution to price discovery in the outer regime. Arbitrageurs tend to 
engage in the market when price deviations are sizable, and their arbitrage activities transfer 
information from the home market to the NYSE (Fremault, 1991). 
The last three columns in Panel A of Table 7 report the results from the smooth 
transition ECM. There are three information shares: ISST, ISPrem, and ISDisc, which are the 
information shares defined on the whole sample, sample with premiums, and sample with 
discounts on the NYSE cross-listings, respectively. The means for these three information 
shares are 37.4%, 38.6%, and 37.9%, respectively. In Panel C, we apply the Wilcoxon signed 
                                                 




rank test to examine the null hypothesis : IS IS . The p-value of the test is 0.036, 
which significantly rejects the null hypothesis. In other words, when the cross-listing trades 
with a discount on the NYSE, the information share of the NYSE is larger than that of the 
TSX, suggesting that, when the cross-listing is underpriced, informed traders choose to trade 
on the NYSE rather than the home listing. 
 
4. Main results 
Our data and variables described and estimated in Section 3 are framed to support our 
claims concerning the dynamics of arbitrage across neither instantly efficient nor fully 
integrated cross-border stock markets in Toronto and New York City. Some of the proposed 
and estimated explanatory variables attempt to proxy for the conspicuous and the latent 
obstacles to seamless arbitrage transactions. If no-arbitrage price relations are achieved 
sufficiently quickly, then the conventional linear measurement methodology of the 
contribution share of price discovery should not be outperformed by our nonlinear, threhold 
and smooth transition propositions. Practical and regulatory impediments to arbitrage will 
“delay” market efficiency. The transition to market efficiency is expected to be either abrubt, 
gradual, or both. Using the obtained estimates and controls, we now empirically identify the 
possible factors determining the scope of market influences on the price discovery of the 
sample cross-listed pairs and the effective required returns to arbitrageurs. 
4.1. Panel dataset construction 
Based on the estimation results in Section 3.4, we construct a panel data for regression 
analyses of the estimates of information shares and thresholds with columns for dependent 
variables, explanatory variables, and control variables. Symbol is the NYSE ticker of a 
TSX-NYSE cross-listed pair. Year is the year index of an estimated value.  




shares of the NYSE in a threshold ECM. IsLin is the information share estimate of the 
NYSE as shown in Harris et al. (1995, 2002). Threshold is the US$-denominated 
threshold estimate. IsSt, IsPrem, and IsDisc are the information shares of the NYSE in a 
smooth trasition ECM for the whole sample, the whole sample given premiums, and the 
whole sample given discounts on cross-listings, respectively. 
 Key explanatory variables. The PIN captures the informativeness of a listing. We use 
estimates of the PINs of both listings of a cross-listed pair to proxy for their relative and 
average degree of efficient information. Since informed traders foster price discovery, 
the information share of an exchange is expected to be larger relative to its cross-border 
counterpart, the higher the PIN of the listing compared to that of its cross-listing. 
PinRatio is the ratio of the PIN of the NYSE over that of the TSX. PinAvg is the average 
PIN of the NYSE and the TSX. PinDiff is the PIN of the NYSE less that of the TSX. We 
also estimate the relative quoted spread measures on both exchanges to proxy for their 
respective degrees of market friction. The threshold (effective required return of 
cross-border arbitrage) of a cross-listed pair is expected to be positively associated with a 
bid-ask spread measure. SpreadRatio is the ratio of the relative quoted bid-ask spread of 
the NYSE over that of the TSX. SpreadAvg is the average relative quoted bid-ask spread 
of NYSE and the TSX. SpreadDiff is the difference of the quoted bid-ask spread of the 
NYSE over that of the TSX. 
 Control variables. UsVol is the average daily trading volume of the NYSE out of both 
the NYSE and the TSX following Eun and Sabherwal (2003). VolAvg is the average of 
the log-transformations of the average daily trading volume measures of the NYSE and 
the TSX. VolDiff is the difference of the log-transformation of the average daily trading 
volume of the NYSE over that of the TSX. UsDollarVol is the average daily dollar 




sum of log-transformations of the average daily dollar trading volume measures of the 
NYSE and the TSX. DollarVolDiff is the difference of the log-transformation of the 
average daily dollar trading volume of the NYSE over that of the TSX. Governance is 
the Report on Business index on the governance of Canadian firms published by the 
Globe and Mail (McFarland, 2002). Industry equals one if the cross-lister is a 
manufacturing firm, and zero otherwise. We believe the governance risk of a Canadian 
firm is reflected in the threshold as a risk premium. Size is the normalized average 
market capitalization on the TSX and the NYSE. VolatAvg and VolatDiff are the average 
and difference of U.S. (S&P 500) and Canada's (TSX 100) USD-denominated market 
index return volatilities, respectively, where Canada’s market return volatility includes 
the exchange rate volatility. Vix is the Chicago Board Options Exchage (CBOE) implied 
volatility of the S&P 500 stock index options. 
4.2. Panel regression analyses 
Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) model and measure price discovery on the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). The 
two contract prices comove relatively closely, but transportation costs and grade differences 
pose difficulties in determining arbitrage opportunities. They investigate two interesting 
questions: How does arbitrage ensure adjustment to the long-run path given location and 
grade differences; and which of the markets is the market leader, or the most important 
contributor to price discovery? 
4.2.1. Regression of information shares per threshold cointegration 
We conduct regression analyses on the constructed panel data to identify the factors 
that affect the relative extent of the contribution of the NYSE to price discovery. The 
estimated outer-regime information shares are regressed onto the panel of explanatory and 




NYSE increases relative to that of the TSX as NYSE-based trades become more informative 
(a higher PIN). This is cross-border evidence that informed trades contribute to fostering 
price discovery, in line with Chen and Choi (2012). Either in quantity or value, the higher the 
liquidity on the NYSE, the more it leads in price discovery. This is consistent with Eun and 
Sabherwal’s (2003) findings where they estimate the information share of the NYSE by using 
Harris et al.’s (1995, 2002) approach. They find that information share is directly related to 
the U.S.’s share of total trading (UsVol), the proportion of informative trades on U.S. 
exchanges and the TSX (confirmed as proxied for by the PIN), and inversely related to the 
ratio of bid-ask spreads on U.S. exchanges and the TSX, which is not discernable.27 A better 
investor-protecting (Governance) and larger (Size) Canadian firm tends to lead price setting 
on the TSX as seen in Models 1 through 4. In Models 9 and 10, controlling for the 
cross-border differential volatilities of market returns and foreign exchange rate (VolatDiff) 
and the market fear factor (Vix), in addition to the liquidity and friction of trades on both 
exchanges, re-affirms the information story (PinRatio) of market contribution to price 
discovery shown in Models 1 through 8.  
 [Insert Table 8 about here.]  
We conduct analoguous panel regressions for the inner-regime and linear information 
shares in Panels B and C of Table 8, respectively. Neither alternative measure of 
exchange-specific contribution to price dicovery has a higher explanatory power (adjusted 
) and economically and statistically meaningful implications. To this end, the outer-regime 
information shares (Table 8 Panel A) prove to be not only heuristically appealing but also 
economically reasonable and statistically robust. 
4.2.2. Regression of the estimated threshold 
                                                 
27 Hasbrouck (1995) finds a positive and significant correlation between contribution to price discovery made 
by the NYSE and its market share by trading volume using U.S. domestic data. Using the same data, Harris et al. 




For each cross-listed pair, the threshold includes transactions costs consisting of bid-ask 
price spreads on both exchanges and the foreign exchange rate, fixed costs, and liquidity 
shorfalls. Implicit risk premiums, including those from information asymmetry and 
macroeconomic uncertainty, can also affect the determination of the threshold. Accordingly, 
Table 9 provides the results of panel regressions of the estimated thresholds onto average 
measures (Panel A) and difference measures (Panel B) of the asymmetric information 
component (PIN). It also shows the inverse of market depth (spread), controlling for liquidity, 
either in quantity (UsVol) or value (UsDollarVol), firm-level idiosyncratic characteristics 
(Industry, Governance, and Size), and aggregate risks (VolatAvg, VolatDiff, and Vix). 
[Insert Table 9 about here.]  
As expected, our measure of market friction (relative quoted spread) significantly 
increases the required dollar return of cross-border arbitrage as shown for 4 out of 10 models 
using average measures (Panel A) and 8 out of 10 models using difference measures (Panel 
B). The better governed the firm is at home, the lower the minimum required profit, as all 
models with the Governance control variable show. Manufacturing firms (when Industry 
equals 1) tend to require larger relative premiums. Exposure to aggregate risks in market 
portfolio, foreign exchange, and market index options appear to buoy arbitrage costs in 
Models 9, 10 (VolatAvg), 19 and 20 (VolatDiff and Vix). Overall, difference measures have a 
greater effect on the threshold level than average measures do, as the adjusted R2’s of Panel B 
dominate those of Panel A for all specifications. In sum, the effective break-even point 
(threshold) of cross-border arbitrage appears to be affected by the relative degree of private 
information, market friction, and liquidity measures, idiosyncratic firm-level characteristics, 
and aggregate risks. These, much economically appealing, empirical results lend support to 





4.2.3. Regression of information shares per smooth transition cointegration 
Since the parity-convergence of a cross-listed pair can instead be gradual rather than 
abrupt, an alternative measure of the contribution to price discovery is the smooth transition 
ECM-implied information share proposed in Section 2.3 and estimated in Section 3.4.3. The 
information shares of the NYSE using the whole sample, and given premiums and discounts 
on cross-listings, are given by IsSt, IsPrem, and IsDisc, respectively. These information 
shares are dependent variables in the panel regressions onto the same group of explanatory 
and control variables shown in the regressions of the threshold ECM-implied information 
shares (Table 8) whose respective results are shown in Panels A, B, and C of Table 10. We 
conduct separate regressions of information shares given premiums (Panel B) versus 
discounts (Panel C) on cross-listings since the NYSE is already shown to be dominant in the 
contribution to price discovery (Table 7 Panel C).  
[Insert Table 10 about here.] 
In Panel A of Table 10, the contribution of the NYSE to the price discovery of a 
cross-listed pair, assuming gradual convergence to parity, appears to be more influential with 
a higher relative population of informed traders (PinRatio), market friction (SpreadRatio), 
and liquidity in both quantity (UsVol) and value (UsDollarVol) on the NYSE vis-à-vis the 
TSX in Models 1 through 6, 9 and 10. Compared to the regression results of the outer-regime 
information share of the NYSE (Table 8 Panel A), the corporate governance (Governance) of 
the Canadian cross-lister does not appear to be effective in determining the venue of price 
discovery when convergence is gradual (smooth transition cointegration) rather than abrupt 
(threshold cointegration). Overall, the smooth transition ECM-implied information share 
appears to be explained by a similar basket of risk factors and controls as in the case of the 
threshold ECM-implied outer-regime information share. The model fitness of both measures 




ECM regression model (Table 10 Panel A) compared to those of the threshold ECM (Table 8 
Panel A) are in the range of 9.6%-29.7% versus 14.4%-27.7%, respectively. These results are 
in stark comparison to those of the linear ECM-implied information share (Table 8 Panel C), 
both in terms of the statistical and economic significance of the risk factors and controls, and 
the model fitness. Thus, not only is there undeniable nonlinearity (Table 3) in the course of 
convergence to parity, but the contribution measures of price discovery are better explained 
when nonlinearity is assumed, in either a threshold regime switch or a smooth transition. 
Panels B and C of Table 10 report qualitatively similar regression outcomes whether we use 
the information share given by premiums or discounts on cross-listings, respectively.28 
 
5. Conclusion 
For a pair of the original listing and its cross-listing, the adjustment to parity can be 
discontinuous: Convergence may be quicker when the relative premium is profitable. In other 
words, the dynamics of cross-listed pairs fall into two regimes: within and beyond the 
threshold, e.g., transaction costs and associated risk premiums of arbitrage. This paper 
extends Harris et al.’s (1995, 2002) ECM to estimate the extent of the contribution to price 
discovery (information share) by considering threshold cointegration as shown in Balke and 
Fomby (1997). Alternatively, since convergence mayinstead be gradual and nonlinear, we 
further generalize the threshold framework to a smooth transition model.  
According to our threshold and smooth transition ECMs, the information share and 
threshold are estimated and regressed with the following empirical implications: First, the 
TSX and the NYSE appear to have integrated over time. Second, parity-convergence 
accelerates upon discounts on the cross-listings on the NYSE. Third, we find a larger 
                                                 
28 Analogous to Tables 8, 9, and 10, we also conduct panel regressions excluding 9 firm-years of cross-listed 
pairs that are not cointegrated per the Phillips and Perron (1988) test. The results are qualitatively unaffected 




feedback from the NYSE if the price gap exceeds the threshold (required arbitrage return). 
Fourth, informed traders tend to cluster on the NYSE upon discounts on the cross-listings. 
Fifth, information share and threshold are affected by the relative degree of private 
information, market friction and liquidity measures, firm-level characteristics, and aggregate 
risks. 
Lastly, a disclaimer. We do not account for exchange-rate market friction in our 
threshold ECM framework unlike Grammig et al. (2005). This is because of the stationarity 
of the U.S.-Canada exchange rate (Issa et al., 2006). The synchronous trading environment of 
TSX-NYSE cross-listed pairs allows constructing a cointegration system without considering 
the exchange-rate bid-ask spread which risks a sufficiently low margin of error (Eun and 
Sabherwal, 2003). However, including such a source of randomness to models of the 
nonlinear dynamics of cross-listed stocks is of interest for future study. 
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Appendix A. Price discovery of cross-listings 
We extend Garbade and Silber’s (1983) model to develop an equilibrium framework to 
characterize the interactive dynamics of a cross-listed pair simutaneously traded on two 
separate exchanges. Arbitrageurs linking the two markets are subject to market frictions, such 
as transaction fees, capital constraints, etc. We emphasize the role of arbitrageurs in the 
process of inter-market price discovery. 
We first assume that there are two cross-border stock exchanges: the TSX and the 
NYSE. We conveniently index the respective markets: 1, 2. We further assume that there 
are  investors who only trade at home (TSX) and  who only abroad (NYSE), and  
arbitrageurs who trade in and between both markets. We assume that choice of exchanges by 
the first two trader types (one-market traders) is exogeneous and is due to various reasons 
such as distance, language, institutional constraints, transaction costs, etc. 
We specify the behavior of one-market traders in market . With an exponential utility 
function and normally distributed random payoffs for the risky asset, the demand function is 
a linear function of the market price , given by 
					for	 1,2,⋯ , ,   (A.29)  
where  is the endowment (in terms of the shares of the risky asset) of trader j at the 
beginning of period t;  is the reservation price at which the trader is willing to hold the 
endowment; and  ( 0) is the price elasticity of demand, assumed to be the same for all 
one-market traders for simplicity.29 
We now consider the demand function of arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs “buy low and sell 
high” in the two markets, thus their demand function only depends on the cross-border price 
                                                 
29 The demand function of one-market traders is not bounded. This linear demand function with positive but 
finite demand elasticity reflects some regularity conditions, such as exponential utility and quadratic cost 
functions. A short-sales restriction should not affect the demand side. However, it may affect the equilibrium 




deviation. Given respective prices  and , arbitrageur  would submit a buy order in 
market 1	as  
				for	 1,2,⋯ , ,   (A.30) 
where 0 is the demand elasticity and is assumed to be finite due to market 
friction, following Garbade and Silber (1983). Also 		evolves over time as a result of 
time-varying transaction costs and trading risks, such as exchange rate volatility and 
macroeconomic flucations etc. In Section 2, by giving different structure of this time 
variation, we generate three econometric model for empirical studies. 
We assume the abitrageurs hedge perfectly, thus, 
,   (A.31) 
i.e. her short position in one market always equals the long position in the other market.30  
In equilibrium, the two exchanges clear as total supply equals total demand, i.e. 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 ∑ 	 , (A.32) 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 ∑ 	 .  (A.33) 
Inserting the demand function (A.29) into Equations (A.32) and (A.33), we have 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 	 ∑ 	 , (A.34) 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 ∑ 	 .                     (A.35) 
Solving these market clearing conditions for equilibrium prices of the cross-listed pair 
yields 
∑ 	 ∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
,  (A.36) 
∑ 	 ∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
, (A.37) 
where ∑ 	  and ∑ 	  are the markets’ average reservation 
                                                 





In order to derive dynamic price relationships, we specify an evolution mechanism of 
the reservation prices  and , following Garbade and Silber (1983), as 
					for	 1,2, 1, 2,⋯ , .  (A.38) 
As the reservation price 	reflects trader j’s belief on the expected return on the risky 
asset, Equation (A.38) describes the updating process of her belief. Specifically, as market  
clears at the end of period 1 with a partial equilibrium price , each trader is willing 
to hold her share of asset  (which will be her endowment in the subsequent period ), 
indicating that 	was her reservation price after the clearing in period 1. At the 
beginning of period t, the trader updates her belief (or the new reservation price , based 
on the past belief (or the reservation price . The new information, signal which 
consists of two components: , common to all investors in both markets, and an 
idiosyncratic component	 . We assume that  and  are i.i.d normal random variables 
with a mean of zero and a constant variance, respectively. 
In aggregate, the market reservation prices  and  can be expressed as 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 ,   (A.39) 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 .   (A.40) 
Substituting  and  into the Equations (A.36) and (A.37), we have, 
∑ 	 ∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
̃ ,  (A.41) 
∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
̃ ,  (A.42) 
where 
̃
∑ 	 ∑ 	 ∑ 	 ∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
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.   (A.44) 





,  (A.45) 
where 
∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
, (A.46) 
∑ 	
∑ 	 ∑ 	
. (A.47) 







.  (A.48) 
This VECM describe the short-term dynamics toward the long run equilibrium, given 
the cointegrating vector 1, 1 . The short term adjustment coefficients  and  for 
respective prices,  and , reflect their responses to deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium in the respective markets. We apply the permanent transitory decomposition 
(Gonzalo and Granger, 1995) to this VECM: The permanent component is a linear 
combination of ( ,  formed by the scaled orthogonal vector of the adjustment 
coefficient vector , . Specifically, the permanent component is given by 
,  (A.49) 
where 
,  (A.50) 
.  (A.51) 
The contribution share of each price to the permanent component is captured by  




determining the long-run equilibrium price. In other words, they are relative measures of 
market-specific contributions to the price discovery of the cross-listed pair. 
Define Δ ≡  as the dollar premium on the cross-listing against its original 
listing. It can be shown that 
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.  (A.53) 
Following Garbade and Silber (1983),  measures the reciprocal convergence speed 






Appendix B. Estimation and testing of parameters 
For convenience, the firm indicator ( ) is omitted in the following discussion. The 
threshold ECM mentioned in Section 2.2 is represented as  
Δ ,   (B.54) 
where Δ , ,  1, , Δ , Δ , . . Δ ,  | |
 and | | ;  and  are the parameters to be estimated; and  is 
the threshold parameter to be estimated. 
The threshold VECM can be estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
method proposed by Hansen and Seo (2002). Assuming that the error term ( ) is i.i.d. 
Gaussian, the likelihood function is  
, , Σ, ln|Σ| ∑ 	 , , Σ , , ,  (B.55) 
where , , Δ . The covariance matrix (Σ) is 
an identity matrix due to the i.i.d. Gaussian assumption of the error term. For a fixed ,  
and  are estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, thus  
∑ 	 ∑ 	 Δ ,  (B.56) 
∑ 	 ∑ 	 Δ ,  (B.57) 
and then Δ . By substituting , the 
likelihood function , , Σ,  becomes a univariate function of :  
ln ∑ 	 .   (B.58) 
Following Hansen (2000), the grid search method can be used to estimate  within a 
preset interval , . The mle estimators for  and  can be obtained by inserting . 
To further confirm the threshold effect, we test the following null hypothesis:  





: 	for	some	 ∈ , .   (B.60) 
We use the supremum-Lagrangian multiplier (supLM) test (Hansen and Seo, 2002) to 
test the above hypotheses. The supLM statistic is  
,  (B.61) 
where Ω , ⊗ Π Π , Ω
Γ Γ , and Π , Γ  are the matrices of the stacked rows of  and 
⊗ , respectively. Define  
sup sup ∈ , .   (B.62) 
A bootstrap method is used to generate the critical values since the asymptotic 
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Sample of Canadian firms co-listed on the TSX and the NYSE. 
Company Industry Price (CAD) Return Price (US$) Return No. of obs.
Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc. Industrials 16.27 -0.001 11.01 -0.001 756
Advantage Oil & Gas Ltd. Oil & Gas 2.26 -0.020 1.53 -0.004 268
Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited Basic Materials 8.62 0.000 5.83 0.000 756
Agrium Inc. Basic Materials 15.03 0.000 10.14 0.000 756
Alcan Inc. Basic Materials 45.41 0.000 30.63 0.000 756
Bank of Nova Scotia Financials 8.81 -0.001 5.95 -0.001 754
Barrick Gold Corporation Basic Materials 26.97 0.000 18.17 -0.001 756
BCE Inc. Telecommunications 70.36 0.000 47.92 0.000 756
Biovail Corporation Health Care 67.89 0.000 46.77 0.000 756
BMO Financial Group Financials 62.38 0.000 42.03 0.000 756
Brookfield Properties Corporation Financials 17.85 0.008 13.16 0.001 426
Cameco Corporation Basic Materials 28.64 -0.001 19.36 -0.001 746
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Financials 55.03 0.000 37.18 0.000 735
Canadian National Railway Company Industrials 65.88 -0.001 44.97 -0.001 756
Canadian Pacific Railway Limited Industrials 35.92 0.000 24.20 0.000 756
Canwest Global Communications Technology 19.81 -0.001 13.45 -0.001 721
Celestica Inc. Industrials 65.96 0.002 44.35 0.002 632
CGI Group Inc. Technology 25.30 -0.002 16.67 -0.002 662
Compton Petroleum Corporation Oil & Gas 38.44 0.001 25.97 -0.003 726
Corus Entertainment, Inc. Consumer Services 39.86 0.002 26.93 0.000 333
Cott Corporation Consumer Goods 29.59 0.000 19.99 0.000 734
Domtar Corporation Basic Materials 50.35 0.000 34.02 0.000 734
Encana Corporation Oil & Gas 6.87 0.001 4.87 0.001 727
Energy Metals Corporation Basic Materials 6.76 0.002 4.57 0.001 688
Enerplus Resources Fund Oil & Gas 22.01 0.003 14.87 0.008 706
Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited Financials 52.00 0.000 35.13 0.000 742
Four Seasons Hotels Inc. Consumer Services 65.06 0.001 43.84 0.001 756
Gildan Activewear Inc. Consumer Goods 31.71 -0.032 21.42 0.003 630
Goldcorp Inc. Basic Materials 9.13 -0.001 6.58 0.000 260
Intertape Polymer Group Inc. Industrials 31.97 -0.001 21.64 -0.001 737
IPSCO Inc. Basic Materials 28.67 -0.002 19.52 -0.002 732
Kinross Gold Corporation Basic Materials 3.15 -0.002 2.13 -0.003 755
Magna International Inc. Consumer Goods 81.85 -0.001 55.15 -0.001 756
Manulife Financial Corp. Financials 24.19 0.012 17.09 0.003 333
MDS Inc. Health Care 43.05 0.013 29.09 -0.004 269
Meridian Gold Inc. Basic Materials 7.68 0.001 5.16 0.001 756
Nexen, Inc. Oil & Gas 36.28 0.000 23.65 0.001 34
Nortel Networks Corporation Technology 98.89 -0.001 66.81 -0.001 756
NOVA Chemicals Corporation Basic Materials 27.45 0.000 18.42 0.000 625
Pengrowth Energy Trust Oil & Gas 17.29 0.000 11.68 0.003 735
Petro-Canada Oil & Gas 23.53 0.001 15.86 0.001 754
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. Basic Materials 90.68 0.000 61.20 0.000 756
Precision Drilling Trust Oil & Gas 33.84 0.001 22.76 0.001 756
Quebecor World, Inc. Industrials 35.38 0.001 23.58 0.001 170
RBC Financial Group Financials 70.97 -0.001 48.23 -0.001 756
Rogers Communications Inc. Telecommunications 24.89 0.002 16.73 0.002 756
Shaw Communications Inc. Consumer Services 42.80 0.000 27.54 0.000 631
Stantec Inc. Industrials 43.06 0.001 29.09 -0.001 467
Suncor Energy Inc. Oil & Gas 49.03 0.000 33.38 0.000 756
Talisman Energy Inc. Oil & Gas 40.09 0.000 27.03 0.000 751
TELUS Corporation Telecommunications 39.66 0.000 24.58 0.002 163
The Thomson Corporation Industrials 17.09 0.001 11.54 0.000 735
Tim Hortons Inc. Consumer Services 26.62 -0.001 17.98 -0.001 630
Toronto-Dominion Bank Financials 48.29 0.000 33.19 -0.001 756
TransAlta Corporation Utilities 4.82 0.000 3.26 -0.002 744
TransCanada Corporation Oil & Gas 19.84 -0.001 13.47 -0.001 756
Mean 35.74 0.000 24.13 0.000 649
Median 31.84 0.000 21.53 0.000 740
Standard Deviation 22.84 0.006 15.43 0.002 188




Estimated cointegrating vector. 
b t -statistic
5 %-ile 0.9 -5.25
25 %-ile 0.995 -1.29
Median 0.999 0.25
75 %-ile 1.002 0.99
95 %-ile 1.011 2.94
The prices of the sample TSX-NYSE cross-listed pairs are tested for cointegration per Johansen (1991).
Since we have only two price series in each regression equation in the cointegrated system, there is at most
one cointegrating vector. We estimate the normalized cointegrating vector (1,-b)T by each firm-year, where b
is the cointegrating coefficient. Our results show that most of the estimated cointegrating vectors are (1,-1)T ,
which is of the expected values according to the law of one price. The t-statistics for the null hypothesis










Mean 0.193 0.170 73.516 24.783 0.146
St. Dev. 0.159 0.162 110.814 3.562 0.249
1%-ile 0.010 0.102 10.290 17.861 0.000
10%-ile 0.059 0.103 14.142 21.113 0.000
25%-ile 0.100 0.103 19.664 21.920 0.000
50%-ile 0.157 0.108 31.054 23.101 0.008
75%-ile 0.242 0.143 56.139 28.234 0.142
90%-ile 0.319 0.279 242.699 29.078 0.609
99%-ile 0.808 0.887 509.250 30.407 0.818
Panel B: Wald statistics.
WaldECM1 p -value WaldECM2 p -value WaldDC1 p -value WaldDC2 p -value
Mean 10.118 0.265 32.723 0.260 13.330 0.265 9.349 0.246
St. Dev. 24.471 0.312 87.764 0.324 70.767 0.283 14.630 0.281
1%-ile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.183 0.000
10%-ile 0.099 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.796 0.002 1.162 0.001
25%-ile 0.440 0.005 0.336 0.000 2.012 0.033 2.222 0.028
50%-ile 2.637 0.104 3.193 0.074 5.676 0.167 5.554 0.108
75%-ile 8.068 0.507 16.106 0.563 9.679 0.428 9.636 0.400
90%-ile 15.839 0.755 75.568 0.818 13.810 0.723 14.601 0.759
99%-ile 132.409 0.984 487.706 0.986 28.317 0.981 62.062 0.920
We estimate the threshold (required cross-border arbitrage return) per our threshhold ECM framework following Balke and
Fomby (1997) and extended from Harris et al. (1995, 2002). The threshold effect (supremum Lagrangian multiplier) test
statistic is supLM and is estimated per Hansen and Seo (2002). In order to examine whether the threshold effect happens on the
coefficients of the error correction term or short-term dynamic term in the thresholdhold ECM, WaldECM1 and WaldECM2 are the
Wald test statistics for the null hypotheses of "no threshold effect" on the error correction terms for the TSX and NYSE listings,
respectively. WaldDC1 and WaldDC2 are the Wald test statistics for the the null hypotheses of "no threshold effect" on the short-
term dynamic terms for the TSX and NYSE listings, respectively.
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Table 4
Representative statistics of key independent variables.
Variable Exchange Mean Median St. Dev. Firm-years Hypotheses p-value
PIN TSX 0.242       0.213       0.107       104          H0 : PINTSX ≤ PINNYSE
NYSE 0.214       0.202       0.060       104          H1 : PINTSX > PINNYSE
Spread TSX 0.015       0.007       0.025       104          H0 : SpreadTSX ≥ SpreadNYSE
NYSE 0.022       0.015       0.022       104          H1 : SpreadTSX < SpreadNYSE
Volume (× 1,000) TSX 576.458   272.687   937.816   104          H0 : VolumeTSX ≤ VolumeNYSE
NYSE 276.955   59.472     847.500   104          H1 : VolumeTSX > VolumeNYSE
Dollar Vol. (× $106) TSX 17.236     5.543       43.032     104          H0 : DollarVolTSX ≤ DollarVolNYSE





PIN is the probability of information-based trading per Easley et al. (1996). Spread is the relative quoted spread: bid-ask spread divided by the quoted
mid point. Volume is the total daily trading volume in terms of quantity. DollarVol is the total daily trading volume in terms of value.
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Table 5
Delta estimates of the NYSE.










Panel B: Annual mean estimates.
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1998 0.709 0.709 0.729 0.724 0.701 0.713
1999 0.653 0.653 0.668 0.644 0.641 0.616
2000 0.650 0.650 0.674 0.616 0.619 0.620
Panel C: Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Hypothesis Wilcoxon Stat. p-value
H0 : DeltaDisc ≥ DeltaPrem









1,312               6.446×10-05
0.897 1.000 0.894
DeltaDisc
According to the smooth transition ECM, the Delta of a cross-listed pair is the convergence speed parameter which
measures the reciprocal speed of converenge to parity. DeltaPrem and DeltaDisc are the convergence speed parameters
given premiums and discounts on NYSE cross-listings, respectively.
0.827 0.883 0.814
Delta ( ) DeltaPrem
0.734 0.760 0.722
0.654 0.661 0.641




Estimation of error correction models for Abitibi-Consolidated, Inc.
Panel A: Linear ECM.
Estimate St. Error. Estimate St. Error. Estimate St. Error.
-0.262 0.011 -0.251 0.013 -0.352 0.013
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
0.011 0.016 -0.040 0.014 -0.054 0.016
0.058 0.016 0.048 0.016 0.061 0.020
0.072 0.013 0.130 0.016 0.079 0.012
-0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
0.144 0.020 0.069 0.017 0.057 0.018
-0.144 0.019 -0.096 0.019 -0.077 0.022




Estimate St. Error. Estimate St. Error. Estimate St. Error.
-0.229 0.014 -0.289 0.014 -0.341 0.014
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001
0.001 0.014 -0.024 0.014 -0.051 0.015
0.023 0.015 0.028 0.016 0.037 0.020
-0.259 0.018 -0.191 0.023 -0.340 0.025
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.035 0.045 -0.116 0.048 -0.064 0.038
0.119 0.035 0.122 0.042 0.143 0.054
0.067 0.016 0.058 0.015 0.059 0.014
-0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
0.130 0.019 0.089 0.017 0.060 0.017
-0.171 0.019 -0.108 0.018 -0.088 0.022
0.093 0.019 0.223 0.033 0.114 0.027
-0.004 0.002 -0.007 0.003 0.000 0.002
0.181 0.050 -0.044 0.054 0.047 0.048














In Panel A, the linear ECM is given by 
Δ ∑  Δ ∑  Δ ,
Δ ∑  Δ ∑  Δ .
In Panel B, the threshold ECM is given by 
Δ
∑  Δ ∑  Δ , if	| | γ
	
∑  Δ ∑  Δ , if	| | γ
,
Δ
∑  Δ ∑  Δ , if	| | γ
	
∑  Δ ∑  Δ , if	| | γ
.





Information shares of the NYSE.
Panel A: Summary statistics.
Linear ECM
IS ISIn ISOut ISST ISPrem ISDisc
Mean 0.430 0.362 0.435 0.374 0.386 0.379
St. Dev. 0.258 0.239 0.259 0.254 0.253 0.264
1%-ile 0.030 0.017 0.020 0.001 0.012 0.003
10%-ile 0.087 0.073 0.106 0.059 0.067 0.068
25%-ile 0.215 0.138 0.215 0.173 0.177 0.161
50%-ile 0.416 0.358 0.418 0.352 0.369 0.360
75%-ile 0.601 0.543 0.626 0.543 0.554 0.536
90%-ile 0.816 0.669 0.804 0.707 0.739 0.797
99%-ile 0.948 0.910 0.980 0.946 0.934 0.981
Panel B: Annual mean estimates.
Linear ECM
IS ISIn ISOut ISST ISPrem ISDisc
1998 0.393 0.367 0.386 0.386 0.413 0.381
1999 0.484 0.368 0.514 0.382 0.378 0.401
2000 0.410 0.352 0.442 0.357 0.350 0.374
Panel C: Wilcoxon signed rank test of smooth transition information share.
Hypothesis Wilcoxon Stat. p-value
H0 : ISDisc ≤ ISPrem
H1 : ISDisc > ISPrem
The information share of the NYSE is a relative measure of the contribution made by the NYSE to the price discovery of TSX-
NYSE cross-listed pairs. IS is the linear information share following Harris et al.'s (1995, 2002) standard ECM. Per threshold
ECM, ISIn and ISOut are the inner and outer-regime information shares of the NYSE. Per the smooth transition ECM, ISST, ISPrem,
and ISDisc are the information shares of NYSE using the whole sample, and given premiums and discounts on cross-listings,
respectively.
0.0362,877             
Threshold ECM Smooth Transition ECM
Threshold ECM Smooth Transition ECM
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Table 8
Panel regression results of threshold and linear ECM-implied information shares.
Panel A: Outer-regime information shares.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept 0.651 *** 0.702 *** 0.632 *** 0.683 *** 0.262 *** 0.307 *** 0.206 *** 0.242 *** 0.008 * 0.011 *
PinRatio 0.127 ** 0.122 ** 0.133 ** 0.127 ** 0.151 *** 0.136 ** 0.179 *** 0.168 *** 0.096 ** 0.100 **
SpreadRatio 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000
UsVol 0.386 *** 0.358 *** 0.414 *** 0.454 *** 0.104 *
UsDollarVol 0.300 *** 0.277 *** 0.282 *** 0.336 *** -0.026
Industry -0.054 -0.050
Governance -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
Size -0.390 ** -0.403 ** -0.353 ** -0.368 ** -0.443 ** -0.473 **
VolatDiff 19.048 *** 19.573 ***
Vix -0.018 -0.021
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.252 0.273 0.249 0.207 0.154 0.203 0.144 0.240 0.200
Panel B: Inner-regime information shares.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 -0.026 -0.020 -0.018 -0.022 * -0.021 -0.069 *** -0.068 ***
PinRatio -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 0.008 0.007 0.033 0.032
SpreadRatio 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.066 *** -0.066 ***
UsVol 0.225 0.225 0.200 0.234 * 0.302
UsDollarVol 0.222 0.222 0.213 0.247 * 0.324
Industry 0.000 -0.001
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size -0.030 -0.036 -0.029 -0.035 -0.033 -0.036
VolatDiff -35.897 *** -35.747 ***
Vix 0.054 0.054
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.014 0.025 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.044 0.044 0.185 0.188
Panel C: Linear information shares.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.019 -0.069 *** -0.068 ***
PinRatio 0.049 0.055 0.049 0.055 0.052 0.057 0.065 0.071 0.033 0.032
SpreadRatio 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.066 *** -0.066 ***
UsVol -0.153 -0.151 -0.128 -0.034 0.302
UsDollarVol -0.350 -0.348 -0.330 -0.189 0.324
Industry -0.004 -0.005
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size -0.030 -0.045 -0.025 -0.040 -0.019 -0.034
VolatDiff -35.897 *** -35.747 ***
Vix 0.054 0.054
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 -0.014 0.006 -0.005 0.014 0.010 0.029 0.017 0.025 0.185 0.188
The dependent variables of Panels A, B, and C are IsOut which is the outer-regime information share of the NYSE, a relative measure of contribution made by
the NYSE to the price discovery of TSX-NYSE cross-listed pairs; IsIn which is the inner-regime information share of the NYSE; and IsLin which is the linear
information share (Harris et al., 1995, 2002). Explanatory variables: PinRatio is the ratio of the PIN of the NYSE over that of the TSX. SpreadRatio is the ratio
of the relative quoted bid-ask spread of the NYSE over that of the TSX. UsVol is the average daily trading volume of the NYSE out of both of the NYSE and
the TSX following Eun and Sabherwal (2003). UsDollarVol is the average daily dollar trading volume of the NYSE out of both of the NYSE and the TSX.
Control variables: Governance is the Report on Business governance index of Canadian firms published by Globe and Mail (McFarland, 2002). Industry equals
one if the cross-lister is a manufacturing firm, and zero otherwise. Size is the normalized average market capitalization on the TSX and the NYSE. VolatDiff is
the difference of the U.S. and Canada's market index return volatilities. Vix is the CBOE Volatility Index. The t-statistics of coefficient estimates are
suppressed for the lack of space. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The
observations are in firm-years. All model specificiations are controlled for fixed and year effects.
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Table 9
Panel regression results of threshold values.
Panel A: Regressions onto average measures.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept 1.275 2.488 * 1.085 2.591 * 0.373 1.852 0.625 1.742 * 0.029 0.029
PinAvg -1.419 -2.152 -1.087 -2.082 -0.053 -0.945 -0.410 -1.131 -0.033 -0.014
SpreadAvg 15.217 *** 11.387 * 15.419 *** 11.923 * 3.959 0.782 2.789 -0.214 -2.796 -3.070
VolAvg 0.003 0.032 0.024 0.008 -0.010
DollarVolAvg -0.066 -0.060 -0.067 -0.056 -0.003
Industry 0.366 *** 0.370 ***
Governance -0.010 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 ** -0.010 **
Size 0.458 0.789 0.013 0.411 -0.290 0.126
VolatAvg 15.062 ** 15.765 **
Vix -0.028 -0.027
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.126 0.048 0.052 -0.034 -0.027 -0.029 -0.021 0.074 0.059
Panel B: Regressions onto difference measures.
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
Intercept 1.031 *** 1.007 *** 1.278 *** 1.268 *** 0.567 *** 0.574 *** 0.589 *** 0.590 *** 0.041 * 0.029
PinDiff -1.553 * -1.427 * -1.731 * -1.462 -1.206 -1.212 -1.067 -1.048 -0.076 -0.014
SpreadDiff 10.461 *** 9.386 *** 10.091 *** 10.050 *** 9.299 *** 9.115 *** 7.959 *** 8.064 *** 1.929 ** 3.070 *
VolDiff -0.093 ** -0.051 -0.013 0.002 0.004
DollarVolDiff -0.065 * -0.019 -0.011 0.004 -0.003
Industry 0.495 *** 0.491 ***
Governance -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 **
Size 0.194 0.192 -0.170 -0.132 -0.315 -0.318
VolatDiff 21.082 *** 21.115 ***
Vix 0.038 * 0.038 *
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.193 0.086 0.076 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.036 0.113 0.113
The dependent variable is Threshold which is the US$-denominated threshold estimate. Explanatory variables: PinDiff is the difference of the PIN of the NYSE
over that of the TSX. PinAvg is the average PIN of the NYSE and the TSX. SpreadDiff is the difference of the quoted bid-ask spread of the NYSE over that of the
TSX. SpreadAvg is the average relative quoted bid-ask spread of NYSE and the TSX. Control variables: VolAvg is the average of the log-transformations of the
average daily trading volume measures of the NYSE and the TSX. VolDiff is the difference of the log-transformation of the average daily trading volume of the
NYSE over that of the TSX. DollarVolAvg is the sum of log-transformations of average daily dollar trading volume measures of the NYSE and the TSX.
DollarVolDiff is the difference of the log-transformation of the average daily dollar trading volume of the NYSE over that of the TSX. Governance is the Report on
Business governance index of Canadian firms published by Globe and Mail (McFarland, 2002). Industry equals one if the cross-lister is a manufacturing firm, and
zero otherwise. Size is the normalized average market capitalization on the TSX and the NYSE. VolatAvg and VolatDiff are the average and difference of U.S. and
Canada's market index return volatilities, respectively. Vix is the CBOE Volatility Index. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are suppresed for the lack of
space. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in firm-years. All
model specifications are controlled for fixed and year effects.
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Table 10
Panel regression results of smooth transition ECM information shares.
Panel A: Information shares with whole sample.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -0.121 -0.122 -0.060 -0.060 -0.066 -0.066 -0.025 -0.025 -0.004 -0.004
PinRatio 0.120 ** 0.120 ** 0.119 *** 0.120 *** 0.124 *** 0.124 *** 0.064 0.064 0.073 * 0.073 *
SpreadRatio 0.096 *** 0.097 *** 0.098 *** 0.099 *** 0.099 *** 0.100 *** 0.055 * 0.056 * 0.051 0.052
UsVol 0.726 *** 0.727 *** 0.735 *** 0.431 * 0.483 *
UsDollarVol 0.726 *** 0.727 *** 0.735 *** 0.448 * 0.499 *
Industry 0.016 0.016
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
VolatDiff -25.161 -25.081
Vix -0.008 -0.008
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.285 0.293 0.293 0.297 0.296 0.096 0.098 0.107 0.109
Panel B: Information shares given premiums on cross-listings.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -0.049 -0.050 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.025 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.011
PinRatio 0.081 * 0.081 * 0.081 * 0.081 * 0.084 * 0.084 * 0.051 0.050 0.059 0.059
SpreadRatio 0.117 *** 0.118 *** 0.118 *** 0.119 *** 0.118 *** 0.118 *** 0.067 ** 0.067 ** 0.064 ** 0.064 **
UsVol 0.431 0.432 0.443 * 0.120 0.176
UsDollarVol 0.433 0.434 0.446 * 0.139 0.194
Industry 0.007 0.007
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VolatDiff -25.569 -25.685
Vix 0.016 0.016
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.249 0.259 0.260 0.270 0.270 0.056 0.057 0.059 0.060
Panel C: Information shares given discounts on cross-listings.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intercept -0.165 -0.166 -0.082 -0.083 -0.091 -0.091 -0.043 * -0.043 * 0.014 0.014
PinRatio 0.147 *** 0.147 *** 0.146 *** 0.147 *** 0.153 *** 0.154 *** 0.098 ** 0.099 ** 0.105 ** 0.106 **
SpreadRatio 0.096 *** 0.096 *** 0.098 *** 0.099 *** 0.100 *** 0.100 *** 0.071 ** 0.072 ** 0.067 ** 0.068 **
UsVol 0.811 *** 0.812 *** 0.822 *** 0.706 *** 0.734 ***
UsDollarVol 0.811 *** 0.813 *** 0.822 *** 0.716 *** 0.743 ***
Industry 0.021 0.022
Governance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Size 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
VolatDiff -15.034 -14.736
Vix -0.042 -0.043
No. of Obs. 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Adjusted R2 0.298 0.298 0.304 0.304 0.303 0.303 0.231 0.232 0.234 0.235
The dependent variables of Panels A, B, and C are, per the smooth transition ECM, IsSt, IsPrem, and IsDisc which are the information shares of NYSE using the whole
sample, and given premiums and discounts on cross-listings, respectively. Explanatory variables: PinRatio is the ratio of the PIN of the NYSE over that of the TSX.
SpreadRatio is the ratio of the relative quoted bid-ask spread of the NYSE over that of the TSX. UsVol is the average daily trading volume of the NYSE out of both of the
NYSE and the TSX following Eun and Sabherwal (2003). UsDollarVol is the average daily dollar trading volume of the NYSE out of both of the NYSE and the TSX.
Control variables: Governance is the Report on Business governance index of Canadian firms published by Globe and Mail (McFarland, 2002). Industry equals one if the
cross-lister is a manufacturing firm, and zero otherwise. Size is the normalized average market capitalization on the TSX and the NYSE. VolatDiff is the difference of U.S.
and Canada's market index return volatilities. Vix is the CBOE Volatility Index. The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are suppresed for the lack of space. ***, **,
and * stand for statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The observations are in firm-years. All model specificiations
are controlled for fixed and year effects.
53
